Dailami and Kim argue that credit subsidies are
Their estimates indicate that -without interest ineffective in stimulating business investment in rate controls and o!-forms of subsidy, corpoproductive assets. Instead, they Iead to an rate holdings of speculative assets would have increase in corporate holdings of finanicial assets been one-sevenlth of observed levels. Moreover, and real estate. most corporate real estate holdings appear to be unrelated to production activities. For empirical verification, Dailami and Kim examined investment patterns in a sample of 241
They find little evidence that the Korean Korean corporations listed on the Korea Stock government's interest rate controls and credit Exchange between 1984 and 1988. They found allocation policy have accelerated expansion of a significant positive relation between corporate corporate investment. 11 anything, they are speculative asset holdings and access to subsipartly to blame for the overheated Korean stock dized loans. market during 1986-88.
Page No. continue to deploy credit instruments to address a variety of social, political, and economic problems. In industrialized countries govenmments frequently intervene on a broad scale in efforts to increase the availability of loans to students, fanners, and home owners.I They also extend loan guarantees to exporters and tv large enterprises in financial distress. 2 In developing countries government intervention figures more prominently. Both loans at subsidized interest rates and government loan guarantees are frequently used to encourage investrnent and foster industrialization. Goverunents also impose ceilings on interest rates and loan guarantee fees, provide cheap dirct credit to targeted industries, and bail out fims in financial distress.
Two basic assumptions underlie developing countries' reliance on these strategies. First, extemalities in fmancial markets are presumed to follow from either market failure and structural weaknesses--e.g., the absence of weU organized equity and bond markets-and/or from severity of information asynunetries between lenders and borrowers. 3 Second, it is widely perceived that the PFor instance, Bosworth, Canron, and Rhyne (1987) , Gale (1990 Gale ( , 1991 and a report by the Congressional Budget Office (1981) describe practices in the United States. For other industrialized countries, see Teranishi (1990) , Cox (1986) , and the report of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress (1981) . 2 The best known examples of federal loan guarantees in the United States are the Lockheed and Chrysler bailouts. See Moritz and Seaman (1981) , Ho and Singer (1982) , and Chaney and Thakor (1985) . Govenmuent provisions of loan guarantees abound in other industrialized countries. See, for instance, Green (1985) for the case of France and Sakakibara and Feldman (1983) for Japan.
3 1t is often argued that financial internediaries, left alone, behave overly conservatively and deny crdit to sone creditworthy finns with positive net present value projects. The foregoing of such projects entails social welfare costs. This underinvestment problem can be alleviated if government iitervention fills the infonnation gap and facilitats the provision of long-term loans to the appropriate users. See Stiglitz (1991) for an in-depth discussion on the market failure due to informational asymmetry and moral hazzard problems and Berkovitch and Kim (1990) on the hiteraction between debt contracts and the under-and over-investnent incentves.
various debt subsidies will, by lowering the cost or increasing the supply of funds, induce fimns to expand capital holdings in productive assets such as plants and equipment. These investrnents are in tum anticipated to generate a higher rate of employmnent and economic growth.
The objective of this paper is to question the validity of this second assumption. We suggest that access to low cost borrowing may not necessarily lead to higher investment in productive assets, but rather to investment in finanzial and speculative assets. We elaborate on the conditions under which such an adverse result may occur, and show that these conditions are of a sufficiently general natu:re to warrant serious attention by policymakers.
For empirical verification we focus on investment pattems in Korea, which provides an interesting case study for several reasons. It is well known that Korea has relied on financial market intervention as an impoitant policy instrument for channeling resources to priority sectors and firms. This strategy, which involves directed lending through the Bank of Korea, subsidization of debt via interest rate controls, and provision of loan guarantees at below market rates, has been a hallmark of Korean industrialization policy since the 1960s. By exercising control over corporate funding, the Govenunent has played an active role in determining allocation of scarce capital. One aspect of this intervention is the provision of funds to priority sectors at preferential rates. A second aspect involves risk sharing in long-tem investnents. By invesdng in a project which had the govenmient's blessing, a firm can benefit from the guarantee of a stable and subsidized flow of credit, often irrspective of its economic and financial perfornance. The result of this policy is a significant reduction in the risk of bankruptcy, which in tum reduces the cost of capital for eligible firms.
How effective has this strategy been? To address this question we proceed in the next section with a discussion of debt subsidies. We then provide a simple theoretical analysis of the effect of debt subsidies on corporate investment beha-ior. The analysis shows debt subsidies to be ineffective in increasing the stock of productive fixed assets. Instead, subsidies provide an incentive for fims to increase their holdings of speculative assets. Based on these theoretical results we develop a testable hypothesis in Section m, which is followed by empirical tests in Sections IV and V. The results indicate a significant positive relation between the availability of subsidized loans and corporate speculative investment. Section VI contains concluding remaiks.
H. CORPORATE DEBT SUBSIDIES AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
Debt Subsidy
The most obvious forn of debt subsidy is the provision of funds at below market interest rates. More subtle implicit subsidies arise when there are: (i) official ceilings on interest rates and loan guarantee fees and (ii) bail-outs of companies in fnancial distress. Effective ceilings on interest rates and loan guarantee fees create excess demand for credit and lead to rationing. If for some reason (e.g., persuasion by governmental agencies) banks are required to extend or guarantee loans to high risk finns within the ceilings, the firms that are fortunate enough to obtain such loans or guarantees receive an implicit debt subsidy.
To illustrate, consider a bank that must eam a ten percent return on its loans to break even.
The bank is contemplating a loan request from a firn that has a five percent probability of default, with twenty percent of the loan recoverable in the event of default. To break even the bank must charge at least [(1 + .1) -(.2)(.05)]A/1 -.05) -1 = 14.7%.4 If this rate exceeds the interest rate ceiling, the optimal response for the bank is to deny the loan request. Suppose, however, tuit the bank is required to extend the loan and that the maximum rate it can charge is only 11.5 percent. 5
At this pmise rate, the rate the bank eRt to receive is (1 + .115)(.95) + (.2)(.0S) -1 = 4Let A R = the promised interest rate that fully reflects the default risk of the borrower; p = the probability of default; d = the percentage of the loan recoverable in the event of defimlt; R = the break-even return on the bank's loan portfolio. Then the promised rate R that the bank must charge to break even is: 5 The 11.5% used in this examplc was the actual interest rate ceiling on Korean bank loans during the mid 1980s, which is the sample period used for our empirical tests.
6.925%. Thus, for every dollar loaned, the bank expects to lose 3.075%, and the borrower receives an equivalent implicit subsidy.
A ceiling on loan guarantee fees has an identical effect. Suppose the borrower has instead requested a loan guarantee. Ignoring the costs involved in adninistering loan guarantees, the minimum guamantee fee that the bank must charge in order to break even is (1 -.2)(.05)/(l -.05) = 4.2% of the amount loaned. 6 Suppose, however, that the ceiling on the guarantee fee is only 1.5% and the bank is required to guarantee the loan.7 Then for every dollar guaranteed, the bank expects to lose .015(1 -.05) -(1 -.2)(0.5) = -2.575%.
In sum, ceilings on interest rates and loan guarantee fees in combination with the nonprice allocation of credits, provide implicit interest subsidies to high risk firms.
A final category of debt subsidy arises from govenunent bailouts of fmancially troubled firns. These bailouts typically involve a restructuring of the fin's debt in which the govenmment provides new capital at a substantialy below-mrket interest rate. The new capital often takes the formn of mandated bank loans. 8
Effects of Debt Subsidy on Corporate Investments
To analyze the impact of these explicit and implicit debt subsidies on corporate investrnent behavior, we first consider the traditional approach embodied in both the Keynesian and the neoclassical models of investment. These models reduce the multitude of asset categories on a 6Let g be the loan guarantee fee per dollar of borrowing. Then for each dollar guaranteed the bank will eamn g if the firm does not default, and will lose (I -d) if the fim defaults. (See the preceding footnote for notational definitions.) Thus to break even, g must satisfy the following equation:
companies' balance-sheet to a single item.9 By concentrating on one asset, which is conventionally taken to be "productive fixed capital", these models can describe the set of investment oppommities available to the firm by means of a single downward sloping marginal efficiency of capital schedule. Given such a schedule, a lower (marginal) cost of capital brought about, for instance, through interest rate subsidies, can readily be shown to induce a higher level of investment in proxuctive fixed capital.
This argument is illustrated in Figure 1 which describes the opportunity set of investments facing a representative fimn Figure I depicts the marginal cost of capital (MCC) line and the marginal rate of return (MRR) curve. The marginal cost of capital should be constant in a competitive capital market. As is typically assuned, the fium is confronted with a decreasing marginai rate of return from incremental fixed investments. Without interest subsidies, the profitmaximizing finn will invest up to j* where the marginal cost of capital is equal to the marginal rate of retum.
Suppose, however, that the fwm is given an oppommity to obtain a subsidized loan in the amount of X at the rate of MCC minus k. The firm's cost of capital will be reduced by k up to Xi. Iif X. is less than the profit maximizing level of investment, I*, the subsidy does not affect the marginal cost of capital at J* and hence wiU not increase the investment level. The subsidized loan will only enrich the owners of the firm by an amount kXl without achieving the goal of increasing the firm's investment in fixed assets. finn via "speculative" assets such as financial assets and real estate. Consequently, the optimal investment decision requires investment in fixed assets only up to the original I with the remaining amount of X2 diverted to speculative assets. This investment path is traced by the bold line in Figure 2 . As in the previous case, the subsidized loan will only enrich the owners of the firm without increasing the firm's investment in productive assets.
The objective of increasing the level of corporate investment beyond I*, say to X 2 or I' in Figure 2 , can only be achieved if there is an effective monitoring mechanism that prohibits finns from investing the subsidized loans in anything other than the fixed productive assets which yield rates of return below the firm's opportunity cost of capital. This would require that (1) the process of investment is verifiable at every stage throulgh its completion and (2) there is no collusion between the monitoring agent and the fimn.
In practice governments monitor investments even if the process of investment is not veifiable at every stage, and penalze firms for diverting funds to other uses. While collusion is possible, monitoring agents will require adequate compensation for the risk of detection. Thus a profit maximizing firm will weigh the expected penalties and the cost of bribery against the difference in yields on productive and speculative assets. Consequently, the greater are the expected penalties and the cost of bribery, the greater will be the proportion of subsidized loans used to finance productive assets. In sum, the impact of debt subsidies on the investment behavior of the recipient fm is dependent on the monitoring effectiveness of the govenmment agency which is providing or mandating the subsidies.
M. THE HYPOTHESIS
The Model
The theoretical predictions in the preccding section can be fornalized by means of a switching regression model with a stochastic sample separation point. Let us define Yi and Xi respectively as the amount of investment in speculative assets by fim i and the net flow of subsidized loans received by firm i in a given year. Then Figures 1 and 2 imply that, absent any other sources and uses of funds, Yi will be equal to Xi -1*i if Xi > .*i and zr-o otherwise. More generally, the relation between Yi and Xi can be stated as follows:
Yi a + u2i, if XiSI*i where 3o. P1i and a are the estimation parameters. We assune that the error tenns u 2 2 2 and u 2 i satisfy the usual conditions of E(uli) = E(u 2 i) = 0, and E(uli) = E(u 2 i) = r.
Equation (1) implies that the relation between a firm's investment in speculative assets and its access to subsidized loans depends on whether or not the fim's supply of subsidized loans exceeds its desired level of investment in productive assets. Thus, for furms with X, > 1*i, a positive fraction, ,I3, of the subsidized loan is used to finance speculative investment. In the extreme case in which govenment monitoring is either nonexistent or totally ineffective, profit maxumzng finns will divert all excess financing into speculative assets.
For the group of firms for which Xi < 1*i, we postulate that P1 = 6. The sample separation between the two groups of fims occurs at the point where Xi = I*i, i.e., the nev supply of subsidized loans is equal to the desired level of investment in productive assets. Note that the location of this sample separation point is not readily observable as it depends on the determinants of optimal investment in productive assets.
The procedure for estimating the switching regression model (1) is well known (See Kiefer (1980) , Maddala (1983) ]. Let the probability that firm i belongs to the group of firms with net flows of subsidized loan in excess of I be:
where Zit is a matrix containing observable determinants of each firm's optimal investment in productive assets and supply of subsidized loans, Ot is a corresponding vector of parameters, and F(-) is the standard nonnal distribution function. Potential candidates for inclusion in the matrix Z would include the firm's level of output and profits which may be related to the optimal level of investment in productive assets and the finn's access to subsidized loans. Assume that a proportion k of observations are generated by regime I and (1 -X) by regime II, where regime I represents the group of firms for which Xi > P*i, and regime H represents the remaining fiins. Then the likelihood function for an observation Yi can be written as:
where L and L 2 are respectively given by
(4)
Assuming that u i and u2i are normally and independendy distributed, the likelihood function for
Maxinizing the log of likelihood function (6) with respect to its four relevant arguments, we obtain:
Oo (Y) -
EW.
whereW =W -p -is the condid probability of regime I given Yi; (WX) and
) ax 3respevely the we avemp of xi and Yi.
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Specification
The estimation of the switching regression model described above involves specifying, first, the optimal level of productive investment (1*) and, second, the supply of subsidized loans (X). To estimate the desired level of investment in productive assets, we rely on the following standard model of corporate invesmennt behavior.
where yo, y1, y2, y3 are paramneters to be estimated, Qt is a finn's level of output as measured by sales plus the change ii inventories of final goods, Kt_I is its capital stock of productive assets lagged one year, Ft is a financial variable altematively measured by either the finn's previous year profits or by the first difference in the firm's value as measured by the market capitalization of its equity. Finally, vt is a disturbance term. All variables are scaled by the finr's begining of year book value of total assets. Equation (11) combines the conventional accelerator model with the usual interemporal adjustment specification. It also contains a measure of profitability and stock maket performance designed to capture the firn's present and future investment oppo10nties.
If the supply of subsidized loans to each firm is observable, it is possible to detrmine the probability, Pit, that firm i at time t belongs to regime 1. Using equation (11) we obtain:
L av a 'V where 4(s) represents the unit normal distribution function and o, is the standard deviation of v.°P izm profits are included in the micro investment study of Tybout (1985) for Columbia and Nabi (1989) for Pakistan. The relevance of stock market performance to corporate investment behavior in Korea is discussed in detail in Dailami (1990) .
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The quantity of subsidized loans available to individual fims, however, is not directly observable. We proxy the subsidized loans by the sum of short and long term domestic loans plus foreign loans, which we henceforth define as "loans." There are two main justifications for choosing this proxy. First, most explicit debt subsidies for priority industries and fums have been provided through bank loans which are the major source of short and long tern domestic loans.
Foreign loans are included because most carry explicit govemrnment guarantees.
Second, the implicit debt subsidies due to bailouts and ceilings on interest rates and loan guarantee fees mainly apply to loans emanating from banks and other fmancial intermediaries.
Existing interest rate ceilings do not effectively extend to corporate debt instruments with secondary markets. For instance, the interest rate ceiling on corporate bonds is easily circumvented by selling new bond issues at a discount. Furthermore, govenunent bailouts of fims in financial distress usually require bank participation. 'Te new capital provided in bailouts often takes the form of postponing repayment on old bank debt, extension of new bank loans, and the provision of loan guarantees which allow firms to obtain low cost loans outside of the banking system. 11
The identity of the firns which have benefited from these subsidies is not public information. Although the priority industries were the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s and the electronics industry in the 1980s, not all frms in these industries received equal treatment.
Furthermore, the eligibility requirements for individual firms changed over time as the government revised its industrial policy.
I lfhis heavy reliance on bank participation in the bailout process is possible because Korean banks have been quasi-government agencies. Even after the considerable progress made toward financial liberalization in the late 1980s, bank presidents are still appointed by the govenmnent.
IV. DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The Sample
The sample of companies analyzed here represents all non-financial corporations that had Thus, to be included in the sample, firns must be listed on the Korea Stock Exchange throughout the 1983-88 period, thereby limiting our sample to 241 fims. The sample covers 27 industries which account, in aggregate, for 62.7 percent of the total market value of non-financial corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange at the end of 1988.
Subsidized Loans
As discussed in the previous section, we use the sum of short and long termn domestic loans plus foreign loans to proxy for the firm's supply of subsidized loans.12 The net flow of these loans received by each finm in a given year is estimated by taking first differences of their
To the extent that some of these loans are not subsidized, our measure overstates the true amount of subsidized loans. Note, however, that in equilibrium risk adjusted rates of return on speculative assets are the same as the risk adjusted cost of non-subsidized loans; consequently, furms have no incentive to take out non-subsidized loans to make speculative investments. Ihus the upward bias in our estimate of subsidized loans works against detecting a significant relation between our measure of subsidized loans and speculative asset holdings.
beginnig and end of year outstanding balances. 13 Table I shows that during the sample period of 1983-1988, total domestic and foreign loans account on average for about 35 percent of the book value of firm capital, while debentures account for about 22 percent. The table also illustrates a high degree of variability in the loan to asset ratio across industries. Firms in "other manufacturing" have the lowest average loan to asset ratio (9 percent) while firms in the rubber tire industry have the highest (48.9 percent).
Measuring Investment in Speculative Assets
Detennining what portion of a finm's assets are being held for speculative as opposed to productive purposes is difficult. Balance sheet information, even if it were available in greater detail, could not fully resolve the issue. Clearly, investments in certain assets, such as machinery and equipment, can be regarded as productive, while investments in marketable securities can be categorized as speculative. The difficulty resides in the treatnent of other balance sheet items, particularly land and buildings, which can satisfy both productive and speculative needs. While finms clearly need land and structures to house their machinery and equipment, these assets are at the same timne known to be the most popular avenues of speculative investnent for Korean corporations.
Thus to define speculative assets, we classify total assets into three broad categories: 14 Figure 3 portrays the distribution for 1988, which has a mean and median of 0.126 and 0.075 respectively. These results confirm our earlier conjecture that land and buildings are one of the most popular means of speculation for Korean corporations.
Using the above estimates of h, where BL = value of building and land assets, Q = output, and D-, j=1,...26, are industry dummy variables. Note that (1io + Ti ) measures the marginal capital dand and building)/output ratio for iadustry j. We choose the kadustry with the lowest marginal capital/output ratio and denote it by il*. We then generate estimates for h as hit = (fl*)(Qit/BLit), for t equal to 1983-1988, and i=l,..., 241. 16 Out of the 1446 estimates, 34 estimates were greater than 1 and one estimate was negative. We assign a value of h=1 for those that were greater than one, and h=O for the negative estimate. 17 The surn of the ratios exceeds one hundred percent because the ratios are obtained by dividing the end of year balance of each asset category by the beginning of year book value of total assets. Below 5% 5% -10% 10% -15% 15% -20% 20% -25% 25% -30% Over 30%
Value of h (%O) Thus, m estimating the switching regression model in equation (1), we are testing the joint hypotheses that subsidized loans lead to increased speculative holdings and that compensating balances have not completely circumvented the interest rate ceilings. To the extent that compensating balances reduce the interest subsidies in domestic loans, however, our test contains a bias against detec,ing a positive relation between subsidized loans and speculative asset holdings.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We report below our estimates of the proportion of speculative assets held by Korean corporations that are attributable to the availability of loan subsidies. Since our theoretical analysis shows that the sample separation point depends on the optimal level of productive invesunents, we first estimate investment equation (11) utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression methods and pooled time-series cross section data. Our regression model includes a set of yearly and industry dummies. Inclusion of the yearly dummies is designed to capture the effect of macro economic shocks on corporate investrnent behavior; the industry dummies adjust for industry differences. Table 3 reports the regression results under two altemative specifications for the financial variable: (1) finn profitability lagged one year, and (2) the first difference in the finn's market value of equity. These fmancial variables are intended to capture the effect of present and anticipated future profitability on decisions to invest in fixed assets.
Several conclusions emerge from the estimates reported in Table 3 . First, the estimated coefficients on both output and capital stock are statistically significant and have the expected signs. Furthennore, the magnitude of the coefficients is not sensitive to the choice of financial variables: the coefficients on output and capital stock change respectively from 0.25 to 0.27 and from 0.098 to 0.097, as we switch from the use of stock market capitalization to previous year's profit.
Second, the estimated coefficient for the financial variable is both positive and statistically significant under either specification. Measuring profitability by the stock market performance results in a higher R 2 . This is not surprising because the stock market based measure is forward looking whereas the previous year's profit is backward looking. The first difference in the finn's market value of equity reflects not only current profitability but also the prospects for future profitability and growth opportunities. Because this variable proves to be both theoretically and empirically superior, we conduct the remaining empirical analyses based on results obtained with the stock market perfonnance measure.
Finally, the estimated coefficients for yearly dummies, with the exception of 1987 in column (1), are all statiscally insignificant. This result indicates that the fndainental detenits of corporate investnent behavior in Korea were not subject to temporal instability during the sample period.
We use the estimates reported in column (1) of Table 3 to generate estimates of Pin equation (12) and calculate esdmates of Po, P19 a, and A as described in equations (7) through (10) .l9 The results are reported in Table 4 . The estimated value of 1 is positive and significant, T 9 his estimation process requires the assumption that supplies of subsidized loans are detemiined exogenously. 2) 26 induutty dummies were included in the estimation but an not tepode in the table.
Absolute values of t-statietics are in parnthoes. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. irrespective of the availability af subsidized loans. Possible reasons for these investments include the cross holding of shares held for control purpose and the temporary investment of excess cash.
Recall that Table 2 shows that on average 22% of corporate assets are in speculation categories. Comparison of that 22% with the 3% for the constant terms in Table 4 indicates that most corporate investment in speculative assets is due to the availability of subsidized loans. Hlad there been complete financial liberalization such that all interest rates were competitively detemiined, the fraction of corporate assets invested in speculative assets would have been about one-seventh of observed levels.
To assess the sensitivity of our findings to the estimation method used to separate holdings of buildings and land between productive and speculative purposes, we rerun the switching regression model under two extreme assumptions: (1) all buildings and land were held for speculative purposes, i.e., hit = 0, and (2) all were for productive purpose, i.e., hit = 1, for all finns over the entire sample period. Table 5 contains the resulting estimauts for the coefficients P 1 -23-and A. As expected, the estimates of P, are much higher under the assumptien h 0 O than under the assumption h = 1. More interestingly, the assumption h = 0 increases the estimates of P, and X only slighdy from those in Table 4 . Even under the extreme assunption of h=l, the estimates of P 1 remain significantly posidve in two out of five years, and the estimates of X continue to be significant throughout the sample period.
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 assume that subsidized loans must be invested in either productive, liquid, or speculative assets. This need not be so. The subsidized loans can also be used to retire higher cost loans and equity. The end result would be identical to that achieved by the diversion of subsidized loans to speculative assets: the loans would only enrich the borrower without increasing investment in productive assets. To account for this possibility, we treat declines in other liabilities and equity as increases in speculative assets. Table 6 shows that declines in other liabilities and equity occur frequently and with some yearly variadon. Of 241 firns, the number of finns experiencing such declines ranges from 26 in 1983 to 61 in 1985. Table 7 reports the estimates of P 1 , o, a and A using the revised definidon of changes in speculative assets. The results generally approximate those reported in Table 4 . However, P 1 is higher in 1984 and 1985 and lower in 1987 and 1988 when compared with estimates using the previous defnition of speculative assets. We find a significant positive relation between corporate investmnents in speculative assets and access to subsidized loans. About one-fifth of aU subsidized loans appear to have been used to finance speculative investments. The remaing amount apparently was used as intended. to fuiance fixed and liquid assets. In addition, we fimd that a substantial number of Korean firms were allocated considerably more subsidized loans than were required for the acquisition of productive investments.
Our estimates indicate that an overwhelming proportion of corporate speculative asset holdings are induced by the availability of subsidized loans. It appears that, had interest rates been competitively detemined, the share of corporate assets devoted to speculative holdings would have been one-seventh of that actually observed. Furthermore, a substantial fraction of corporate real estate holdings appears to be unrelated to production activity: our estimates indicate that on average, 86.5% of all corporate real estate holdings were motivated by speculative purposes. 2 2
These results imply that corporate investmenets in speculative assets are both excessive and are induced by the availability of subsidized loans. Thus, if the Korean stock market was indeed 2 1 Consistent with the above conjecture, new equity offerings increased substantially starting in 1986. See Kim and Lee (1990) for firther discussion on issuing stocks in Korea. 2 2 Although 86.5% may appear at first glance to be extremely high, it is not inconsistent with the prior impression one receives from reading Korean daily economic newspapers. Even a casual perusal reveals persistent press criticism regarding excessive real estate holdings by large corporations. Although these criticisms are based on anecdotal evidence, they have led to govemment policies forcing a massive liquidation of corporate real estate holdings. As of this writing, the forced liquidations are still underway.
overheated during the sample period, the government's credit allocation policy and debt subsidies are at least partly to blame.23
Our estimate of the extent to which subsidized loans were diverted to speculative assets may be biased downward due to possible measurement errors in the data. The errors arise because the identity of individual subsidized loans is not public information and because compensating balances may have been used to increase effective interest rates. Depending on the magnitude of those measurement errors, our proxy for subsidized loans overstates the quantity of debt subsidies and biases the result toward finding no relation between subsidized loans and speculative asset holdings.
Finally, what are the implications of our fmdings for developing economies in general?
Did Korea achieve its economic miracle because of, or in spite of, its credit allocation policy?
Although analyzing the underlying causes of Korea's economic miracle is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that Korea's credit allocation policy has been at best a coincidemal feature of the Korean success story. Our data reveal a clear pattem of secular decline in the proportion of fmns receiving more subsidized loans than are needed for productive investment, from a high of 0.54 in 1984 to 0.36 in 1988. In contrast, the average annual real GNP growth rate increased from 6.99o
during 1984-1985 to 12.1% during 1986-1988. If anything, the key factors providing the impetus for high economic growth after 1986
were the so-called three lows, low inflation, low oil price, and low exchange rate, which prevailed from 1986 through the end of our sample period. These three lows represent favorable macro shocks that have drastically enhanced the profitability of real investments. ITe increase in expected profitability in tum has increased the incentives for corporations to invest available funds in productive assets. Our data support this conjcture: the proportion of subsidized loans diverted to speculative investments declined from 27% during the pre-three-low era (1984) (1985) to 16% 2 3 The average rate of retum for all stocks listed on the Korean Stock Exchange during the 1984-1988 period was 56% per year. See Kim and Lee (1990) for firther details.
-29-during the post-three-low era (1986) (1987) (1988) . In conclusion, we find little evidence supporting the contention that subsidized loans have contributed to corporate investment boom in Korea.
